Utilitarianism and Praxeology

Is it possible to use praxeology to have a greater understanding of ethics?

By J.W. Rich

Utilitarianism has - at best - a mixed reputation among Libertarian circles. The majority of Libertarian scholars and authors have traditionally been skeptical of utilitarianism as a basis for a Libertarian ethic, opting for a natural rights defense in its stead (most notably in Murray Rothbard’s “Ethics of Liberty”). I am not going to argue that utilitarianism’s reputation among Libertarians is wholly undeserved. Utilitarianism in its classical, Benthamite form is rightly deserving of the lion’s share of its criticism. I propose, however, that Utilitarianism more broadly is a framework that can be saved and rejuvenated into an intellectually defensible edifice compatible with a Libertarian ethic. In order to do so, however, we have to fix and address many of the problems that have plagued (and continue to plague) the corpus of Utilitarianism today. This will require a re-examination of the basic planks of Utilitarianism, going back to the writings of Utilitarianism’s architects, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.

First, what is utility? Despite being the cornerstone of the entirety of Utilitarianism, Bentham and John Stuart Mill had only vague notions of the nature of “utility”. In his “Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation”, Bentham writes:

“By ‘utility’ is meant the property of something whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness (all equivalent in the present case) or (this being the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is concerned.” (pg. 7)

Bentham equates utility with “producing benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness”, or preventing “mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness”. However, in reading this definition one gets the feeling that it is less than satisfying. To describe utility, Bentham uses the terms “benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness”. However, it isn’t immediately clear what he means with these terms either. Bentham’s definition here feels vaguely circular. But if we flip back a few pages to the opening paragraphs of the book, we can get a fuller picture of Betham’s definition:

“Nature has placed under mankind the governance of two sovereign masters, plain and pleasure. They alone point our what we ought to do and determine what we shall do [emphasis original]” (pg. 1)

John Stuart Mill agrees with Mill’s definition here. In his short pamphlet, “Utilitarianism”, Mill writes:

“The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals ‘utility’ or the ‘greatest happiness principle’ holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleasure.” (pg. 7)

Utility, then, is really just shorthand for “that which is seen as pleasurable”. Of course, what does Bentham mean by pleasure? Is it just pleasure all the way down? Bentham gives us the following description of pleasure in the opening paragraphs:

“They govern us in all we do, all we say, all we think; every effort we can make to throw off our subjection ·to pain and pleasure· will only serve to demonstrate and confirm it. A man may claim to reject their rule but in reality he will remain subject to it.” (Pg. 1)

Thus, Bentham describes pleasure as simply “that which we desire to get”. He also states that even though we might “claim to reject their rule”, the pursuit of pleasure is inescapable. Even so, this clarification from Bentham only poses more questions. If utility is essentially pleasure, and pleasure is equivalent to the feeling of desire to want, then what exactly does it mean to say that someone is experiencing pleasure? After all, not all desires are created equal. The desire to graduate from college is very different from the desire to eat a ham sandwich for lunch. But if they are both pleasure because they are both desires being fulfilled, what exactly is the common denominator here? It seems that Bentham still hasn’t quite answered the core question of the nature of utility.

It was precisely this question over the meaning of pleasure and utility that led John Stuart Mill to adopt the distinction between “higher pleasures” and “lower pleasures”. Animals are only capable of engaging in lower pleasure, such as eating and drinking. Man alone has the faculties necessary for obtaining higher pleasures, such as reason and philosophy. However, this distinction brings problems all of its own. What is the relationship between higher and lower pleasures? Which is the “exchange rate” or ratio between them? How do we internally feel the difference between these two types of pleasures? This dichotomy has (justifiably) failed to gain support beyond Mill’s own writings.

The tendency of Bentham, Mill, and others to equate utility with numerous other terms such as happiness, pleasure, benefit, advantage, that-which-we-try-to-get, etc. is revealing in and of itself. It demonstrates that they can see what utility is associated with - all of its contingent properties and manifestations - but they don’t have a coherent picture of its core attributes. To borrow Aristotelian language, they understand the accidents of utility, but not its substance. Bentham comes the closest to giving a full description with his definition of pleasure as being that which is sought after, but he doesn’t expand on this enough or give any further details on precisely what this means.

Given that the Benthamite views on utility are lacking in their definiteness, what should be substituted in their place? How should we understand the concept of utility? To grasp the meaning of utility, we have to grasp the broader construct within which utility exists: the desires and actions of human beings. This brings us to the subject of Praxeology.

Praxeology - as defined and enumerated by Ludwig Von Mises - employs the concept of “utility” in reference to action. Mises traces the cause of all action to “uneasiness” - the same term used by Bentham. Uneasiness is the result of a divergence between the world as it is versus the world as the actor would like it to be. Spurned on by this disparity, the actor acts, utilizing means to attain ends that bring the world around him closer in accordance to its desired state. The alleviation of this uneasiness through achieving ends is the essence of utility.

From the Praxeological perspective, utility is not connected with any particular feeling or mental state. It is much more fundamental. Utility is the end goal of action qua action. The Praxeological framework goes much deeper than just thoughts or feelings. Our minds are wired to think in Praxeological terms. There is no way for us to view the world outside of a Praxeological lens. Just as there is no way for us to remove ourselves from logic and look at the world from a non-logical perspective, there is no way for us to look at the world from a non-Praxeological perspective. Utility - defined as the achievement of ends - is therefore a foundational element of the human psyche. Thus, utility is not identified with a mental state, but with a Praxeological state. While the alleviation of uneasiness might (and often does) come accompanied with feelings of happiness, pleasure, and benefit, these particular mental phenomena are only “signals” of utility gained and not the utility itself.

Adopting this Praxeological view of utility, many of the flaws of Utilitarianism can be succinctly resolved. To start, utility in the Praxeological sense is a purely individual phenomenon. The utility that an actor feels as a result of end-achievement is purely subjective. Consequently, it cannot be measured, as there is no objective unit of measurement perceivable. Utility can be ranked originally by the actors themselves, as the achievement of some ends deliver more utility than others. However, this ranking is purely self-referential and cannot be compared to the utility of anyone else. Despite the usage of such units as “Utils” to interpersonally compare utility, such units do not and can not exist.

One of the greatest flaws of the Benthamites was the failure to recognize this fact. In many ways this omission was the “original sin” which led to all of Utilitarianism’s later flaws. Far too often did they coast seamlessly from discussion about the utility felt by the individual to the “utility of a community”, without ever once asking if such a concept was even well-defined. For example, Bentham writes:

“The interest of the community’ is one of the most general expressions in the terminology of morals; no wonder its meaning is often lost! When it has a meaning, it is this. The community is a fictitious body composed of the individuals who are thought of as being as it were its members. Then what is the interest of the community? It is the sum of the interests of the members who compose it.” (An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, pg. 7)

While on first glance this might appear to be Bentham agreeing with the notion that utility is an individual phenomenon, he makes a fatal blunder in the last sentence: “It is the sum [emphasis added] of the interest of the members who compose it”. By virtue of its strict subjectivity, utility cannot be added or subtracted interpersonally - it cannot be summed together in any way. However, that is just what Bentham ventures to do. This is confirmed just two paragraphs later:

“An action then may be said to conform to the principle of utility. . . .when its tendency to increase the happiness of the community is greater than any tendency it has to lessen it. And the same holds for measures of government, which are merely one kind of action performed by one or more particular persons” (pg. 7)

For Bentham, as well as the other Benthamites that followed him, the utility of any particular action could be measured and compared between individuals to derive the overall utility of any action taken on society at large. This total sum of utility dictates whether the action should or should not be taken. This implicit assumption - that utility could be interpersonally measured - has unfortunately remained with utilitarianism ever since. As a result, this principle has opened  utilitarianism to justified and well-deserved criticism from philosophers, skeptics, and detractors of all kinds. Examples include Robert Nozick’s “utility monster” and H.J. McCloskey’s morally scrupulous sheriff. What these and other arguments point out is that adopting Bentham’s principle above that Utilitarianism is equivalent to maximizing the utility of a community leads to morally unacceptable and highly unituitive outcomes. Seeing as how this proposition has only weakened Utilitarianism and is incompatible with a stronger, Praxeological understanding of utility, I proposed that it be jettisoned into the wasteland of forgotten ideas once and for all.

What then, should be erected in its place? How can we construct a system of ethics based on a Praxeological understanding of the human condition and human experience? I know nobody likes a cliff-hanger, but the answer to these and other questions will be answered in my forthcoming book, “Praxeological Ethics”. My goal with this book is to detail and defend a system of Libertarian ethics built on a Praxeological foundation, unifying economics and ethics under one broad, action-oriented umbrella.

I would love to tell you when the book is coming out, but I truthfully don’t know myself. It should be out by the end of the year, but I can’t commit to anything more concrete than that. Regardless, I hope that the questions raised here have piqued your interests in how Praxeology might be applied to ethical questions, and the answers we might be able to find.

About the Author

J.W. Rich is an independent writer whose upcoming book is titled Praxeological Ethics. He is also the host of the Marginal Investigations Podcast. Rich’s long form writings can found here.