The Myth of Neutrality: A Critique of Libertarianism
Despite the great goodness found in libertarianism, there are ultimately major issues.
Many libertarians believe that if one reasons from a neutral starting point, libertarianism will naturally emerge as the most ethical and rational political framework. They often insist on being open-minded, objective, and willing to follow evidence wherever it leads. While this posture sounds commendable and rational—an ideal we all admire in principle—the reality is that no one is capable of reasoning from a truly neutral starting point. Every person brings preconceptions, presuppositions, and prior commitments that shape how they interpret evidence and draw conclusions.
Libertarianism itself depends on a set of foundational presuppositions—prior beliefs they hold to be true. For instance, it assumes that individuals exist as distinct entities, capable of making choices and acting with purpose. It presupposes that people are moral and legal agents whose actions and interactions hold significance.
Additionally, libertarianism believes conflict can exist among individuals and the belief that such conflicts should be resolved in ways that respect each person’s autonomy and dignity. This assumes the existence of principles, such as conflict, autonomy, dignity, and fairness, that guide conflict resolution. All of these presuppositions presuppose a world that is orderly and consistent—a world where cause and effect operate predictably and where reason and logic are reliable tools for resolving disputes. Without these assumptions, the libertarian vision of resolving conflicts through rational discourse and voluntary cooperation cannot hold.
Libertarian reasoning also depends on universals—abstract principles or truths that apply universally. The laws of logic, such as the law of non-contradiction, are a clear example of this reliance, as they underpin all rational discourse, including libertarian argumentation. Similarly, concepts like the Non-Aggression Principle (NAP), central to much of libertarian thought, rest on the assumption that certain moral or legal truths can be applied universally, transcending individual preferences or cultural norms. Libertarianism also presupposes the validity of property rights, treating them as more than practical tools, but as binding claims tied to the relationships between individuals and resources. These ideas are rely on deeper assumptions about universals, morality, and the nature of human relationships.
Even more fundamentally, libertarianism presupposes that the world is knowable and that reason and logic are trustworthy means of acquiring knowledge. It assumes that purposes and intentions are real, that people make genuine choices, and that other minds—distinct from one’s own—exist. These are profound metaphysical and epistemological commitments, not neutral or universally agreed-upon starting points.
This is just a small example of the presuppositions underlying libertarian thought. They reveal an important truth: libertarianism, like any worldview, is built on a network of assumptions that shape its reasoning and conclusions. These assumptions are not neutral and must be acknowledged and critically examined. To suggest otherwise—to claim that libertarianism arises purely from reason and neutrally-minded inquiry—is to overlook the deep philosophical foundations upon which it rests and how reason works in general.
The Presuppositional Conflict Among Libertarians
Libertarians face a significant challenge in justifying their foundational presuppositions, and the diversity of ways in which they do so reveals a deeper tension within the movement. These presuppositions are embedded in broader webs of belief—different worldviews that shape how libertarians understand the nature of human beings, morality, rights, and the universe itself. The way these beliefs are justified and how they are situated in differing webs of belief has profound consequences, influencing not only how libertarians interpret and apply principles like the Non-Aggression Principle (NAP), but also how they behave in practice and how they affect the long-term stability of a libertarian order.
Take, for example, the assumption that human beings have value—that individuals are worthy of moral and legal consideration. Is this value objective, grounded in something transcendent like natural rights or God? Or is it subjective, a construct of society or individual preference? How this question is answered—whether human value is intrinsic or contingent—forms a crucial part of a libertarian’s broader worldview. And the answer to those questions doesn’t exist in isolation: they are interconnected with other fundamental beliefs about the nature of human freedom, justice, and the universe itself. These foundational questions—What is human value? What is the nature of rights? Where does justice come from?—are not just abstract philosophical musings; they shape behavior, inform policies, and determine the practical application of libertarian principles.
For libertarians who view human value as objective, grounded in God or inherent to human nature, their worldview includes a commitment to universal moral truths. These principles are seen as fixed and unchanging, regardless of social context or personal preference. For them, libertarianism is not merely a pragmatic choice; it is a reflection of deeper truths about the human condition, rights, and justice. The NAP, for instance, is not just a useful guideline for peaceful coexistence, but a moral imperative rooted in the inherent dignity of the individual.
In contrast, libertarians who regard human value as subjective often justify libertarian principles in pragmatic terms. For them, the value of human beings may depend on societal agreements or utilitarian calculations—what works best in a given context. Here, libertarianism is viewed less as a universal truth and more as a practical framework for achieving desirable outcomes, such as peace, prosperity, or individual autonomy. It becomes contingent on context and utility: "This works better than the alternatives, so it is worth pursuing." This approach allows for flexibility but introduces the possibility of inconsistency, as the principles of libertarianism may shift depending on changing preferences or circumstances.
These divergent justifications of human value are not merely differences of opinion—they are part of entirely different webs of belief. The tension between these perspectives reflects a deeper philosophical divide. Those who view human value as objective also believe in objective moral and legal principles, while those who see it as subjective approach libertarianism as a more pragmatic tool for achieving certain ends. These worldviews shape not just the intellectual defense of libertarianism but also its practical application. A libertarian who believes in objective human dignity may defend the NAP as a non-negotiable moral law, while one who holds a more relativistic view may prioritize outcomes and be more flexible in applying the NAP depending on the situation. And this tension about human value is just one point of tension that exists among a massive amount of conflicts between alternative worldviews.
Human action is driven by the ideas individuals hold. These ideas are not isolated; they are embedded in larger systems of belief, and those systems inevitably influence behavior. A libertarian who believes in objective value, for example, will likely approach political and social issues with a sense of moral absolutism, while a libertarian who believes in the subjectivity of value may adopt a more utilitarian, flexible approach. Over time, these differences in worldview will manifest in contrasting behaviors, priorities, and strategies for advancing libertarian principles.
Given the diversity of webs of belief that underpin libertarian presuppositions, and how these belief systems inevitably shape actions, it stands to reason that tensions will arise from the incompleteness of libertarianism and the competing/alternative worldviews within it. This diversity introduces an inherent instability, calling into question the long-term viability of a libertarian society. Without a cohesive, universally accepted foundation, libertarianism may struggle to maintain coherence and consistency over time. This is what we currently see with the classically liberal foundations of the West.
This uncertainty prompts a deeper reflection: Libertarianism undoubtedly provides valuable insight. But what role does libertarian legal theory and its insights have within a broader framework? Can its conclusions be applied meaningfully within more coherent and consistent worldviews, or do they stand as a fragmented system that is ultimately incompatible with a unified, sustainable worldview? The long-term stability of libertarian principles depends not only on their internal logic but also on how they relate to the larger worldview commitments that shape their application in society.
Libertarianism as Passive Nihilism
Libertarianism today is defined by its ambiguous relationship with truth, no longer placing it at the center of its framework. While not overtly dismissive, libertarianism relegates truth to the private realm, transforming it from a guiding principle into a matter of personal concern. This is shown by its ethos “do what you will, but don’t violate other people’s property rights.” In focusing primarily on individual autonomy and property rights, it avoids addressing deeper moral or existential questions, leaving truth and its role in our lives unaddressed. This creates a framework where Truth becomes increasingly irrelevant to public life, undermining any shared vision of morality or the good.
This shift opens libertarianism to attacks from more rigid, absolutist ideologies that see this detachment from Truth as a critical weakness. The result is a social "fog," a vague and fragmented worldview unable to address the complexities of human existence. Libertarianism is a passive nihilism because it doesn’t put at its center the Truth. By decentering Truth, libertarianism fails to establish a coherent foundation for a stable society, leaving it vulnerable to more determined, coherent ideologies that emphasize absolute truths.
Historically, libertarianism (liberalism), has often compromised with revolutionary forces, making concessions rather than confronting challenges with a firm commitment to truth. These compromises may delay immediate revolutionary outcomes but ultimately accelerate the erosion of the principles that once defined libertarian thought. By abandoning "old truths," libertarianism weakens its own ideological integrity, opening the door to ideologies that challenge the very principles of liberty and autonomy. Only a return to Truth and putting it at the center of our lives can rescue the good of libertarianism.
The decline of libertarianism reveals a deeper trend: without a firm commitment to the Truth, its framework becomes increasingly incapable of resisting radical change. Its pragmatism and materialism leave it ill-prepared to defend against critiques from more coherent worldviews, leaving its principles fragile and unstable. The great parts of libertarianism have been purposefully disconnected to enduring, transcendent truths, leaving its philosophy shallow and unmoored.
This loss of grounding extends beyond the individual, contributing to the unraveling of societal order. Without a solid foundation and focus on Truth, libertarianism's ability to defend itself against radical critiques diminishes, ultimately collapsing under the weight of its own tensions. In its place may arise more aggressive, unyielding ideologies that claim a deeper commitment to truth, but often pursue a harsher, more cynical worldview.
In this sense, libertarianism is a passive nihilism, a fog that breeds more radical forms of nihilism. Its failure to establish a stable foundation invites the rise of ideologies that promise certainty, but often at the cost of individual freedom and moral integrity.